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Naquin v. Elevating Boats, LLC:
The Fifth Circuit’s Improper
Expansion of Jones Act “Seaman
Status” Qualification
Timothy M. O’Hara
I.

Introduction

Imagine a deckhand that works aboard vessels utilized in
offshore drilling and dredging operations.1 As a deckhand, he
must maintain the decks and superstructure, and assist with
mooring and cargo handling.2 He is employed by the owner of a
fleet of vessels and required to work at offshore job sites for
extended periods of time.3 While assigned to an offshore site,
he works every day, sleeps aboard the vessel at night, and
returns to shore when the job is completed.4
For the sake of comparison, now imagine a vessel
repairman that works at a shipyard for a vessel service
company.5 He works on vessels that are either moored or
docked in the immediate area, or lifted up by a crane in the
company shipyard.6 He spends roughly seventy percent of his
time aboard these secured vessels performing repairs,
replacements, and maintenance activities, and thirty percent of

1. See Naylor v. Atl. Sounding Co., 481 F. App’x. 173 (5th Cir. 2012).
2. MARINE TRANSPORTATION SERVICES, INC., http://marinetransportation
services.com/deckhand.pdf (last visited August 14, 2015); SOUTHERN TOWING
CO., http://southerntowing.net/downloads/deckhand-job-description.pdf (last
visited August 14, 2015).
3. See generally Harbor Tug & Barge Co. v. Papai, 520 U.S. 548, 560
(1997) (holding that an employee whose work was not “of a seagoing nature”
could not qualify as a seaman).
4. Yelverton v. Mobile Labs., Inc., 608 F. Supp. 400,402-03, 406 (S.D.
Miss. 1985), aff’d, 782 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1986).
5. See Naquin v. Elevating Boats, L.L.C., 744 F.3d 927 (5th Cir. 2014).
6. Id.
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his time performing duties in the shipyard.7 He goes home at
the end of every workday and is rarely aboard the vessels while
such are at open water.8
Which employee is exposed to the dangers of
“unpredictable weather, rough tides, sudden sickness, and
exhausting labour”9 that accompany working at sea? According
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the
answer is both. In March 2014, in Naquin v. Elevating Boats,
L.L.C., a majority of that court held that the second worker
qualified as the type of maritime employee that Congress
decided to provide heightened legal protections because of the
risks involved in working at sea.10 A strongly written dissent
followed and asserted that this was not the type of worker that
Congress had in mind.11 This is just the latest chapter in the
federal courts’ lengthy novel about the treatment of maritime
workers in personal injury cases.
The story began nearly a century ago, when Congress
enacted the Jones Act and effectively made “seamen the most
generously treated personal injury victims in American law.”12
But defining a Jones Act seaman has not come easy, as it took
the United States Supreme Court seventy five years to arrive
at the modern seaman status test.13
This commentary
examines the “tortured history”14 of the Jones Act, how
qualification for the statute’s protections has evolved, the
modern seaman status test, and the implications of the Fifth
Circuit’s recent application thereof. Section II gives a brief
history and explanation of maritime law in the United States
and the sources of federal court jurisdiction over maritime

7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Harden v. Gordon, 11 F. Cas. 480, 483 (C.C.D. Me. 1823).
10. See generally Naquin, 744 F. 3d 927.
11. Id. at 941-44.
12. 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2012); Shailendra U. Kulkarni, The Seaman
Status Situation: Historical Perspectives and Modern Movements in the U.S.
Remedial Regime, 31 TUL. MAR. L.J. 121, 121 (2006) (citing David W.
Robertson, The Supreme Court’s Approach to Determining Seaman Status:
Discerning the Law Amid Loose Language and Catchphrases, 34 J. MAR. L. &
COM. 547, 547 (2003)).
13. See generally Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347 (1995).
14. Id. at 358.
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cases. Section III discusses pre-Jones Act maritime personal
injury claims and the significance that the statute’s enactment
has had on the maritime industry. Section IV discusses the
evolution of the seaman status test to the modern framework.
Section V discusses the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Naquin v.
Elevating Boats, L.L.C. Section VI discusses the implications of
this holding and proposes an adjustment to the seaman status
test.
II. Maritime Law in the United States
A.

What is Maritime Law?

Generally, “admiralty [law] is viewed as a legal realm that
is—because of historical and practical considerations—weird
and different.”15 It regulates the settlement of problems
arising from sea navigation and commerce.16 Where relevant
statutory law is lacking, an admiralty court will apply the
general maritime law.17 General maritime law is judge-made
federal common law that is drawn from many sources.18 When
clear general maritime law precedent is absent, courts may
look to, but are not bound by, the prevailing land law.19 Where
relevant legislation and precedent are both lacking, admiralty
courts may impose their own rule.20 However, this authority is
subject to limitation, as the courts’ role is to adjust and not to
revolutionize.21
15. See David J. Bederman, Law of the Land, Law of the Sea: The Lost
Link Between Customary International Law and the General Maritime Law,
51 VA. J. INT’L L. 299, 302 (2011). See also Ernest A. Young, Preemption at
Sea, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 273, 305 (1998).
16. 2 C.J.S. Admiralty § 1 (2014) (citing United States v. Matson Nav.
Co., 201 F.2d 610 (9th Cir 1953)).
17. Id., at § 3 (citing East River S.S. Corp. v. Transam. Delaval, Inc., 476
U.S. 858 (1986)).
18. Id. (citing Fairest-Knight v. Marine World Distributors, Inc., 652
F.3d 94, 98 (1st Cir. 2011)).
19. Id. (citing Igneri v. Cie. De Transports Oceaniques, 323 F.2d 257 (2d
Cir. 1963); Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625,
630-32 (1959); Imperial Oil, Ltd. v. Drlik, 234 F.2d 4 (6th Cir. 1956)).
20. Id. (citing Trinh ex rel Tran v. Dufrene Boats, Inc. 6 So. 3d 830, 839
(La. Ct. App. 2009)).
21. Id. (citing Noel v. United Aircraft Corp., 204 F. Supp. 929, 939 (D.
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B. Federal Court Jurisdiction of Maritime Cases
1.

Statutory Authority

The federal courts’ jurisdiction over maritime cases comes
from several sources. The United States Constitution reads, in
relevant part, that “[t]he judicial Power shall extend to all
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the
Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under their authority; . . . to all Cases of admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction.”22 This constitutional authority is
codified in title 28 United States Code section 1333(1), under
which federal district courts have original jurisdiction,
exclusive of state courts, over “[a]ny civil case of admiralty or
maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other
remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.”23
2.

Judicial Interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1)

The traditional test for determining whether the federal
courts had maritime jurisdiction over a case was based on the
locality of the wrong.24 That is, “[i]f the wrong occurred on
navigable waters, the action is within admiralty jurisdiction; if
the wrong occurred on land, it is not.”25 The United States
Supreme Court overruled the locality test in Executive Jet
Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, holding that maritime
jurisdiction based solely on the placement of the wrong was
absurd.26 The Court held that section 1333(1) jurisdiction
requires a “maritime nexus,” involving some relationship

Del. 1962).
22. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1). See also 2 AM. JUR. 2d Admiralty § 9 (2014)
(citing White v. United States, 53 F.3d 43, 45 (4th Cir. 1995)).
24. See Exec. Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 253
(1972).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 261. (The court compares this to conferring admiralty
jurisdiction to a swimmer at a public beach, injured by another swimmer or a
submerged object).
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between the tort and traditional maritime activities relating to
navigation or commerce on navigable waters.27
The Court refined this concept in Foremost Insurance Co.
v. Richardson, holding that section 1333(1) jurisdiction extends
to cases of damage or injury on navigable waters where the
alleged wrong bears a significant relationship to a traditional
maritime activity, commercial or otherwise.28 Factors that are
significant to this analysis include the functions and roles of
the parties, the involved vehicles and instruments, the type
and cause of injury, and the traditional concepts of the role of
admiralty law.29
III. Personal Injury Claims of Maritime Workers
A. The Osceola
In the pre-Jones Act era, the federal courts treated seamen
negligence claims against their employers harshly.30 In fact,
seamen did not have a viable claim to damages when injured as
a result of their employers’ negligence.31 In The Osceola, the
plaintiff, an employee of the defendant vessel owner, was
aboard a moving vessel when he and other crew members were
ordered to use a derrick32 to lift the gangways,33 although the
vessel was at open sea and proceeding against strong winds. 34
He was struck and injured when the winds pushed the
gangway and derrick over.35 The United States Supreme Court
denied the plaintiff’s right to sue his employer for negligence
and announced four rules relating thereto:
27. Id. at 256.
28. See Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668 (1982).
29. John B. Spitzer, Annotation, Admiralty jurisdiction: maritime nature
of tort – modern cases, 80 A.L.R. Fed. 105 (1986).
30. See Courtney L. Collins, The Act Up the Sleeve: Federal Courts Allow
Employer Counterclaims for Property Damage to Wipe Out the Jones Act
Claims of Seamen, 37 TUL. MAR. L.J. 175, 177 (2012). See also 2 ROBERT
FORCE & MARTIN J. NORRIS, THE LAW OF SEAMEN §30:2 (5th ed. 2011).
31. Collins, supra note 30, at 177.
32. A crane-like device.
33. A movable platform used to board and disembark a vessel.
34. The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 159 (1903).
35. Id.
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1. That the vessel and her owners are liable, in
case a seaman falls sick, or is wounded, in the
service of the ship, to the extent of his
maintenance and cure, and to his wages, at least
so long as the voyage is continued.
2. That the vessel and her owner are, both by
English and American law, liable to an
indemnity for injuries received by seamen in
consequence of the unseaworthiness of the ship,
or a failure to supply and keep in order the
proper appliances appurtenant to the ship.
3. That all members of the crew, except,
perhaps, the master, are, as between themselves
fellow servants, and hence seamen cannot
recover for injuries sustained through the
negligence of another member of the crew beyond
the expense of maintenance and cure.
4. That the seaman is not allowed to recover an
indemnity for the negligence of the master, or
any member of the crew, but is entitled to
maintenance and cure, whether the injuries were
received by negligence or accident.36
The Court effectively limited a seaman’s recovery for
injuries caused by his employer’s negligence to maintenance
and cure, a duty imposed on vessel owners by reason of the
employment contract that does not depend on the negligence of
the vessel owner and is not limited to injuries sustained in the
course of a seaman’s employment.37 Maintenance includes that
which the seaman is entitled to while at sea, such as living
expenses.38 Cure includes the care, nursing, and medical
expenses incurred in the period during which the duty
continues.39 Additionally, a seaman’s right to damages was
limited to injuries resulting from a vessel’s unseaworthiness.40
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 175.
Id. at 175; Calmar S. S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 527 (1938).
Calmar S.S. Corp., 303 U.S. at 528.
Id.
Osceola, 189 U.S. at 175.
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B. Jones Act Enactment
The Osceola holding, rendered in 1903, brought to
Congress’s attention the inadequacies of the recovery scheme
for seaman under the general maritime law.41 At this time,
personal injury actions were experiencing change, as “modern
workers’ compensation schemes were increasingly available to
certain land-based workers and railroad employees were
afforded liberal actions against their employers.”42 But, despite
the federal courts’ acknowledgement that the nature of their
employment exposed them to greater dangers, seamen were
afforded less generous treatment than their land based
counterparts.43 The imbalance needed rectifying.
In 1920, Congress attempted to resolve the disparity by
enacting the Merchant Marine Act, more commonly known as
the Jones Act, which granted seamen the same remedies
afforded railway employees under the Federal Employers
Liability Act of 1908 (“FELA”), including a cause of action
based on the negligence of one’s employer.44 The Jones Act
states:
A seaman injured in the course of employment
or, if the seaman dies from the injury, the
personal representative of the seaman may elect
to bring a civil action at law, with the right of
trial by jury, against the employer. Laws of the
United States regulating recovery for personal
injury to, or death of, a railway employee apply
to an action under this section.45

41. See Kulkarni, supra note 12, at 126.
42. Id. (citing Taylor Simpson-Wood, Loose Lips Launch Ships: Stewart
v. Dutra Construction Company, Inc., 37 J. MAR. L. & COM. 113, 119 (2006).
43. Harden v. Gordon, 11 F. Cas. 480, 483 (1823) (Circuit Justice Story
stating that “Seamen are by the peculiarity of their lives, liable to sudden
sickness from change of climate, exposure to perils, and exhausting labor.”).
44. Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 354 (1995); Simpson-Wood,
supra note 42, at 119. See also 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (2012); Kulkarni, supra
note 12, at 127.
45. 46 U.S.C. § 30104.
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This enactment completed the trilogy of heightened legal
protections provided to seamen because of their exposure to the
perils of the sea: 1) maintenance and cure; 2) damages for
injuries resulting from a vessel’s unseaworthiness; and 3)
damages for injuries resulting from the negligence of a vessel
owner.46 Significantly, Congress did not define the term
seamen, failing to clarify exactly which workers qualified for
Jones Act protection.47 This omission “ultimately cause[d]
great inconsistency and confusion” in federal courts for the
next century.48
C. Early Interpretation of the “Seamen” Definition
Before Congress enacted the Jones Act, the general
maritime law employed a broad definition of the term seaman
and granted that status to “virtually anyone who worked with
or aboard any kind of vessel capable of any kind of
movement.”49
Workers afforded seamen status included
sailors, vessel officers, bartenders, cabin boys, carpenters,
chambermaids, clerks, cooks, coopers, divers, doctors, dredge
workers, engineers, firemen, fishermen, harpooners, horsemen,
interpreters, masons, muleteers, musicians, pilots, pursers,
radio operators, seal hunters, stewards, surveyors, and
waiters.50
In International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, a case
involving a stevedore51 who was struck and injured when a
supervisor, employed by the defendant-vessel owner,
negligently caused freight to fall from the vessel, the United
States Supreme Court considered the reach of the Jones Act.52
The Court held that, although stevedores are not seamen for
most purposes, the work in which the plaintiff was engaged
was a maritime service.53 It did not believe “Congress willingly
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Kulkarni, supra note 12, at 122.
Chandris, 515 U.S. at 355.
Kulkarni, supra note 12, at 127.
Robertson, supra note 12, at 554.
E.g., Robertson, supra note 12, at 554-55.
A person employed at a dock, to load and unload cargo from ships.
See generally 272 U.S. 50 (1926).
Id. at 51-52.
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would have allowed the protection to men engaged upon the
same maritime duties to vary with the accident of their being
employed by a stevedore rather than a ship.”54 As one
commentator has noted, the Haverty Court interpreted the
Jones Act as making seaman status more inclusive, as opposed
to restrictive.55
D. The Longshoreman and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act
After the Court’s Haverty decision, the “inconsistent,”
“confus[ing],” “befuddling,” and “wayward” process of
restricting the seamen definition began.56
Congress
unmistakably disapproved of that Court’s interpretation of a
Jones Act seaman, taking just six months to enact the
Longshoremen and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act
(“LHWCA”).57 This was the first of many steps taken to restrict
the definition of a Jones Act seaman.
The LHWCA provides workers’ compensation benefits to
covered maritime employees for injuries incurred within the
scope of one’s employment on the navigable waters of the
United States, including an adjoining pier, wharf dry dock,
terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoining area
customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading,
repairing, dismantling, or building a vessel.58 It also provides
maritime workers a right to sue for negligence as third parties
in certain circumstances.59 Most importantly, the LHWCA
specifically excludes “any master or member of the crew of any
vessel” from its coverage.60 Significantly, the LHWCA does not
give an explicit definition of “master or member of the crew of
any vessel,” but the United States Supreme Court, in bizarre
54. Id.
55. See Robertson, supra note 12, at 555.
56. Robertson, supra note 12, at 555,(citing McDermott Int’l, Inc. v.
Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 348-53 (1991)).
57. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-9501. See Swanson v. Marra Bros., 328 U.S. 1, 5-6
(1946).
58. 33 U.S.C. § 903(a).
59. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (“In the event of injury to a person covered under
this chapter caused by the negligence of a vessel, then such person...may
bring an action against such vessel as a third party”).
60. 33 U.S.C. § 902(3)(g).
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fashion, used this language to define a Jones Act seaman.61 In
Swanson v. Marra Bros., the Court dismissed the plaintiffstevedore’s Jones Act claim, holding that he was not a seaman:
We must take it that the effect of these
provisions of the Longshoremen’s Act is to
confine the benefits of the Jones Act to the
members of the crew of a vessel plying in
navigable waters and to substitute for the right
of recovery recognized by the Haverty case only
such rights to compensation as are given by the
Longshoremen’s Act.62
The Court effectively declared seaman, as used in the Jones
Act, and “master or member of a crew of any vessel,” as used in
the LHWCA, to be interchangeable phrases.63 Thus, with the
Jones Act’s inclusion of seaman, and the LHWCA’s exclusion of
“any master or member of a crew of any vessel,” the Swanson
Court interpreted the compensation regimes as mutually
exclusive.64 It is worth noting that the mutually exclusive
nature of these statutory remedies has been complicated in
modern application.65 The strange approach taken by the
Court in tackling the definition of a Jones Act seaman has
61. See Robertson, supra note 22 at 555-56.
62. Swanson, 328 U.S. at -3, 7
63. Kulkarni, supra note 12, at 129-30.
64. Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 355-56 (1995).
65. While the Jones Act’s “seaman” and LHWCA “master or member of a
crew” are synonymous, there is a “zone of uncertainty” where a fact finder
may reasonably find coverage under either act. For example, there may be
conflicting evidence concerning a particular worker’s duties or undisputed
evidence about a particular worker’s duties that exhibits characteristics of
both traditionally land and sea based duties. A discussion of this issue is
beyond the scope of this commentary. See Evan T. Caffrey, Splicing the Net: A
Legislative Answer to the Problem of Seaman Status Under the Jones Act, 14
TUL. MAR. L.J. 361, 372-73 (1990); Kenneth J. Reimer, Showdown in the Fifth
Circuit: Legros v. Panther Services Group, Inc., 13 TUL. MAR. L.J. 341 (1989).
See also Chenevert v. Travelers Indem. Co., 746 F.3d 581 (5th Cir. 2014)
(holding that "an insurer who makes voluntary LHWCA payments to an
injured employee on behalf of a ship owner/employer is entitled to recover
these payments from the employee’s settlement of a Jones Act claim against
the ship owner/employer based on the same injuries for which the insurer has
already compensated him." ).
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invited criticism. One commentator has asserted that, “[t]he
Swanson Court’s conclusion . . . has led to a judicial course
which is far different than the one originally envisioned by
Congress for both shore-based and sea-based maritime
workers.”66 But regardless of the means employed, by enacting
the LHWCA and issuing the Swanson holding, Congress and
the Court, respectively, made clear that seaman, as used in the
Jones Act, was a restrictive term reserved for a very particular
class of workers.
E. Advantages of Qualifying as a Jones Act Seaman
Seamen are “the most generously-treated personal injury
victims in American law.”67 The advantages accompanying the
protections of the Jones Act motivate maritime plaintiffs to
vigorously seek seaman status. First, the burden on a seaman
to establish employer negligence is “very light” and
“featherweight.”68 Second, Jones Act seamen are entitled to
damages for the unseaworthiness of a vessel, and vessel
owners’ face strict liability and a non-delegable duty under
such claims.69 Third, Jones Act seamen are also entitled to
maintenance and cure payments,70 of which there are no
limitations on amount or duration.71 Fourth, the Jones Act
grants a plaintiff the right to a jury trial, providing a greater
potential for a substantial damages award.72
In comparison, the benefits offered by the LHWCA are far
less generous. First, the LHWCA’s workers’ compensation
scheme, while similar to maintenance and cure, is

66. Simpson-Wood, supra note 42, at 123.
67. Robertson, supra note 12, at 547 (citing ROBERTSON, ET AL.,
ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 240 (2001)).
68. Michael A. Orlando, Supreme Court Rules a Dredge Is a Jones Act
Vessel,
INT’L
RISK
MANAGEMENT
INST.
(March
2005),
http://www.irmi.com/expert/articles/2005/orlando03.aspx?cmd=print
(citing
Zapata Haynie Corp., v. Arthur, 980 F.2d 287, 289 (5th Cir. 1992)). See
Kulkarni, supra note 12, at 123.
69. Orlando, supra note 68.
70. See supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
71. Orlando, supra note 68.
72. Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2012); Orlando, supra note 68.
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distinguishable by its various limitations.73 For example, there
is a cap on available compensation, equal to two hundred
percent of the applicable national average weekly wage.74
Similarly, while Section 905(b) of the LHWCA permits a cause
of action against a vessel for unseaworthiness, the maritime
worker’s burden in establishing causation is that of regular
Additionally, the LHWCA’s compensation
negligence.75
structure is managed by the federal government, whereby the
Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs determines the
precise amount of compensation awarded to the non-seaman
maritime worker.76 Finally, the LHWCA does not provide a
qualified injured maritime employee with a negligence action
against his employer—”[i]n exchange for no fault-liability for
limited compensation benefits owed to their non-seaman
employees, employers of such non-seamen garner immunity
from tort liability.”77
The advantages of qualifying as a Jones Act seaman are
obvious. As summarized by one commentator, “while the Jones
Act seaman, bearing his ‘featherweight’ burden of proof, may
have a legal remedy for his employer’s negligence, the nonseaman is relegated to workers’ compensation benefits under a
scheme that is arguably less generous than even the seaman’s
additional remedy of maintenance and cure.”78
IV.

The Jones Act Seaman Status Tests

In the seventy five years following Congress’s enactment of
the Jones Act, the federal courts’ determination of who
qualifies as a seaman was far from simple. The issue was
frequently revisited by the United States Supreme Court, with
analytical adjustments made upon each consideration. As one
commentator has noted, the seaman status issue’s instability
caused a great deal of frustration and contradicted the

68).

73. 33 U.S.C. §906(b). See Kulkarni, supra note 12, at 124.
74. Id.
75. See Kulkami, supra note 12, at 123-24 (citing Orlando, supra note
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 125.
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principles of predictability expected of a stare decisis judicial
system.79
In 1941, the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit considered the seaman status question in Carumbo v.
Cape Cod S.S. Co., and held that a Jones Act seaman and
LHWCA “member of a crew” were not interchangeable terms.80
A Jones Act seaman was any person employed or engaged to
serve aboard a vessel in any capacity.81 Qualification as a
LHWCA “member of a crew” required that the ship be in
navigation, that the worker, more or less, have a permanent
connection with the ship, and that he primarily aid in
navigation.82 Despite the subsequent overruling Swanson
holding,83 the language of the Carumbo “member of a crew”
requirements was retained in future seaman status tests
advanced by the United States Supreme Court.
In 1943, in O’Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co.,
the Court considered the case of a deckhand injured by a falling
counterweight after he was ordered ashore.84 The Court held
that the plaintiff was a Jones Act seaman and adopted a status
based seaman status test:
The right of recovery in the Jones Act is given to
the seaman as such, and, as in the case of
maintenance and cure, the admiralty jurisdiction
over the suit depends not on the place where the
injury is inflicted but on the nature of the service
and its relationship to the operation of the vessel
plying in navigable waters.85
This extended the traditional general maritime law principles
79. See John R. Hillsman, Still Lost in the Labyrinth: The Continuing
Puzzle of Seaman Status, 15 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 49, 50 (2002).
80. Carumbo v. Cape Cod S.S. Co., 123 F.2d 991, 994 (1st Cir. 1941).
81. Id. at 994-95.
82. Id. at 995.
83. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
84. See generally O’Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S.
36 (1943).
85. Id. at 42-43. This was a drastic step from the Haverty line of cases
which called for “seaman” status to be determined based on the location and
type of activity performed when injured.
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applied to maintenance and cure to the seaman’s newly created
rights under the Jones Act and indicated the desire for a purely
status based inquiry.86
In 1952, the United States Supreme Court took steps
backwards in Desper v. Starved Rock Ferry Co, a case involving
a boat operator who was killed when a fire extinguisher
handled by a colleague exploded as they prepared the
defendants’ boats for the summer season.87 The Court held
that Jones Act seaman status “depends largely on the facts of
the particular case and the activity in which he was engaged at
the time of the injury” and that the decedent’s activities at the
time of the accident were not those typically done by seaman,
but “by exclusively shore-based personnel.”88 Even though the
decedent would resume boat operating activities come summer,
“[t]he fact that he had been, or expected in the future to be, a
seaman does not render maritime work which was not
maritime in its nature.”89 This was a retreat from the status
based inquiry adopted in O’Donnell and return to the Haverty
analysis that had been deemed incorrect.
The issue was revisited just six years later in Grimes v.
Raymond Concrete Pile Co, a case involving a pile driver that
typically worked ashore, was sent to work from a barge at sea
for several hours, and was injured aboard a tugboat as it
returned to shore.90 The United States Supreme Court held
that the evidence was enough to create a factual question as to
the plaintiff’s seaman status.91 In a dissenting opinion, Justice
Harlan claimed that the majority disregarded the principles
outlined in O’Donnell and Swanson and reduced the seaman
definition to “nothing more than a person injured while
working at sea.”92 He believed a greater connection was needed
to be a Jones Act seaman.93 Albeit through a dissenting
opinion, the desire for restrictive, status based definition of
86. See generally id.
87. 342 U.S. 187, 188-90 (1952).
88. Id. at 190.
89. Id. at 191 (citing Antus v. Interocean S.S. Co., 108 F.2d 185, 187 (6th
Cir. 1939)).
90. 356 U.S. 252, 252-55(1958).
91. Id. at 253.
92. Id. at 255.
93. Id.
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seaman was clear.
In 1959, in Offshore Co. v. Robinson, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered the case of a
general laborer and driller’s helper that was assigned to a
drilling platform mounted on an engineless barge.94 He
severely fractured his leg as he tried to avoid sixteen hundred
pounds of piping catapulting towards him, an accident, in part,
caused by his employer’s failure to provide additional safety
personnel.95 The Fifth Circuit held that:
[T]here is an evidentiary basis for a Jones Act
case to go to the jury: (1) if there is evidence that
the injured workman was assigned permanently
to a vessel . . . or performed a substantial part of
his work on the vessel; and (2) if the capacity in
which he was employed or the duties which he
performed contributed to the function of the
vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission, or
to the operation or welfare of the vessel in terms
of its maintenance during its movement or
during anchorage for its future trips.96
This holding returned the analysis to the status based inquiry
established in O’Donnell and Swanson and advocated by
Justice Harlan in Grimes. Just one year later, the Fifth Circuit
modified the Robinson test and held that a connection to an
identifiable fleet of vessels or a finite group of vessels under
common ownership were sufficient to achieve seaman status.97
The modified Robinson test eventually became the
prevalent seaman status test among the federal circuits,
influencing Jones Act cases reviewed in the First,98 Eighth,99

94. 266 F.2d 769, 771-72 (5th Cir. 1959).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 779.
97. See generally Braniff v. Jackson Ave.-Gretna Ferry, Inc., 280 F.2d
523 (5th Cir. 1960).
98. See Bennett v. Perini Corp., 510 F.2d 114, 115 (1st Cir. 1975).
99. See Miller v. Patton-Tully Transp. Co., 851 F.2d 202, 204 (8th Cir.
1988).
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and Eleventh Circuits.100 For the next thirty five years, the
modified Robinson test and the Carumbo “member of a crew”
test were recognized and applied, with slight variations, in
every federal circuit to consider the seaman status issue.101
The consensus was that the proper analysis involved a status
based inquiry. That is, each circuit required that a maritime
worker have a significant connection to a vessel in navigation,
or identifiable fleet of vessels, and, if not a more or less
permanent connection to such, at least substantial work aboard
a vessel.102
In following years, the Fifth Circuit added a temporal
element to the seaman status analysis.103 In Barrett v.
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., the plaintiff was a welder’s helper that
sometimes performed maintenance and repair work from
offshore platforms.104 Approximately seventy to eighty percent
of his work was performed on platforms where no auxiliary
vessel was needed.105 At the time of his injury, the plaintiff
was performing welding services on a caisson106 located ten to
twelve miles offshore.107 A barge was positioned alongside the
caisson for equipment and material storage and remained
stationary until the assignment’s completion.108 The plaintiff
initially injured his back while on the boat that transferred
him to the job site, and hurt it a second time the next day while
attempting to lift a heavy pipe on the barge.109 The Fifth
Circuit held that, “if the employee’s regularly assigned duties
require him to divide his time between vessel and land (or
platform) his status as a crew member is determined ‘in the
context of his entire employment’ with his current employer.”110

100. See Caruso v. Sterling Yacht & Shipbuilders, Inc., 828 F.2d 14, 15
(11th Cir. 1987).
101. See Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 367 (1995).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 366.
104. Barrett v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 781 F.2d 1067, 1068 (5th Cir.
1986).
105. Id.
106. A watertight chamber used in construction work under water.
107. Barrett, 781 F.2d at 1069.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1075.
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Because only twenty to thirty percent of the plaintiff’s overall
employment duties involved working from vessels, he did not
qualify as a Jones Act seaman.111 Since the Barrett decision,
the Fifth Circuit has declined to confer seaman status where
the worker spends less than thirty percent of his time aboard
vessels.112
The United States Supreme Court set the stage for the
modern seaman status test in 1991. In McDermott
International Inc. v. Wilander, the plaintiff was a paint
foreman that supervised sandblasting and painting work done
on oil drilling platforms.113 While assigned to a vessel, he was
struck in the head by a bolt that blew out under pressure.114
The Court granted certiorari to analyze and compare the
“contribute to the function of the vessel” requirement of the
Robinson test with the “aid in navigation” requirement of the
Carumbo test.115 Ultimately, the Court abandoned the “aid in
navigation” requirement in favor of an analysis that focused on
an employee’s connection to a vessel in navigation.116
Explaining that all employees who work at sea in the service of
ship are exposed to the perils which Congress intended to protect
against, the Court held that it is not the employee’s particular
job but his connection to a vessel that is determinative:117
In this regard, we believe the requirement that
an employee’s duties must ‘contribut[e] to the
function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of
its mission’ captures well an important
requirement of seaman status. It is not necessary
that a seaman aid in navigation or contribute to
the transportation of the vessel, but a seaman
must be doing the ships work.118

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 1076.
See Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 367 (1995).
McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 339 (1991).
Id.
Id. at 340.
Id. at 354.
Id.
Id. at 355.
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The question of seaman status became a mixed question of law
and fact.119 The inquiry was status based and dependent upon
whether an employee’s connection to a vessel, or fleet of
vessels, exposed him to the dangers involved in working at sea
that motivated Congress’s enactment of the statute in 1920.120
The Wilander holding was refined into the modern seaman
status test four years later in Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis.121 The
plaintiff, a salaried superintendent engineer, was responsible
for maintaining and updating the electronic and
communications equipment aboard the defendant’s fleet of
vessels.122 His duties extended to the entire fleet, requiring
him to both take voyages on the vessels and direct ship
maintenance from shore.123 During a voyage to Bermuda, the
plaintiff developed a problem in his right eye, and the vessel’s
doctor did not follow proper medical procedure when he advised
the plaintiff to rest for two days until the plaintiff could see an
eye specialist ashore.124
In Bermuda, the plaintiff was
diagnosed with a detached retina and underwent surgery.125
He ultimately lost seventy five percent of the vision in his right
eye and subsequently brought Jones Act claims.126 The United
States Supreme Court reviewed the case to resolve “the
continuing conflict among the Courts of Appeals regarding the
appropriate requirements for seaman status under the Jones
Act.”127 The Court acknowledged that its Wilander decision
was a step in the right direction but held that such “did not
consider the requisite connection to a vessel in any detail and
therefore failed to end the prevailing confusion regarding
seaman status.”128
Consistent with the analysis of the Swanson, O’Donnell,
and Wilander Courts before it, the majority rejected the
defendant’s proposition that “anyone working on board a vessel
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/8

Id. at 356.
Id.
515 U.S. 347 (1995).
Id. at 350.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 350-51.
Id. at 353.
Id. at 357.

18

280

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 36:1

for the duration of a ‘voyage’ in furtherance of a vessel’s
mission has the necessary employment-related connection to
qualify as a [Jones Act] seaman.”129 The Court explained:
A brief survey of the Jones Act’s tortured history
makes clear that we must reject the initial
appeal of such a ‘voyage’ test and undertake the
more difficult task of developing a status-based
standard that, although it determines Jones Act
coverage without regard to the precise activity in
which the worker is engaged at the time of the
injury, nevertheless best furthers the Jones Act’s
remedial goals.130
After examining the extensive history of Jones Act
interpretation in the federal courts, the Court confirmed that
“the Jones Act inquiry is fundamentally status based,” such
that land based maritime workers do not become seaman
because they happen to be working on a vessel at the time of
injury and seamen do not lose Jones Act protection when their
employment takes them ashore.131 The Court explained that
Jones Act jurisprudence makes clear that a more enduring
relationship between the worker and a vessel is
contemplated.132
In light of those principles, the Court adopted a two-prong
seaman status test.
First, an employee’s duties must
contribute to the function of the vessel or the accomplishment
of its mission.133 Second, the employee must have a connection
to a vessel in navigation, or an identifiable group of vessels,
that is substantial in both duration and nature.134 Under the
first requirement, initially established in Wilander, “all who
work at sea in the service of the ship are eligible for seaman

129. Id. at 358.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 361.
132. Id. at 363 (citing Barrett v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 781 F.2d 1067,
1075 (5th Cir. 1986)).
133. Id. at 368.
134. Id.
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status.”135 The second requirement is intended to separate sea
based maritime workers, entitled to Jones Act protection, from
land based maritime workers possessing only a “transitory or
sporadic connection to a vessel in navigation” and who are not
exposed to the perils of the sea in the same way.136 The
seaman status inquiry remained a mixed question of law and
fact, but was narrowed to only those with the requisite
employment related connection to a vessel in navigation.137
Also significant, the second requirement demands an
employment related connection to a vessel in navigation that is
substantial in both duration and nature:
The duration of a worker’s connection to a vessel
and the nature of the worker’s activities, taken
together, determine whether a maritime
employee is a seaman because the ultimate
inquiry is whether the worker in question is a
member of the vessel’s crew or simply a landbased employee who happens to be working on a
vessel at a given time.138
While acknowledging that seaman status is not merely a
temporal concept, the Court also held that the Barrett thirty
percent rule, although not dispositive, should serve as a
guideline.139 The Court stressed that departure from this
figure “will certainly be justified in appropriate cases.”140
Just two years later, in Harbor Tug & Barge Co. v. Papai,
the Court was tasked with clarifying the second prong of the
Chandris test.141 There, it declared that the fundamental
purpose of the Chandris test’s “substantial connection
requirement” was to give effect to Congress’s intent to
distinguish sea based maritime workers from those “whose
employment does not regularly expose them to the perils of the
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
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McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 355 (1991).
Id.
Id. at 369.
Id. at 370.
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sea.”142 Thus, for it to serve its purpose, analysis of the second
prong must focus on whether the employee’s duties take him to
sea.143
V. Naquin v. Elevating Boats, L.L.C. – What Happened?
In March 2014, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit reviewed Naquin v. Elevating Boats, L.L.C.144
Elevating Boats, L.L.C. (“EBI”) manufactures, operates and
maintains a fleet of specialty lift-boats and marine cranes out
of numerous Louisiana ports.145 In 2005, Edward Naquin, Sr.
(“Naquin”) was hired at EBI’s Houma, Louisiana shipyard as a
vessel repair supervisor, primarily responsible for the
maintenance and repair of EBI’s lift-boat vessels.146 Naquin
typically worked aboard the lift-boats while such were moored,
jacked-up, or docked in the canal adjoining EBI’s shipyard.147
Roughly seventy percent of his time was spent aboard these
vessels, performing repairs, cleaning and painting, replacing
defective or damaged parts, going on test runs, securing
equipment, and operating the vessels’ marine cranes.148 About
two or three times each week, he completed these duties while
a given vessel was moved to another location within the
immediate canal.149 Rarely, Naquin repaired vessels and
served as the crane operator aboard a vessel at open water.150
He spent the remaining thirty percent of his time working in
the shipyard’s fabrication shop or operating the shipyard’s
land-based crane.151
In November 2009, Naquin was using an EBI land based
crane to relocate a test block when the crane failed and
toppled.152 Upon jumping from the crane house, he broke bones
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id.
Id.
Naquin v. Elevating Boats, L.L.C., 744 F.3d 927 (5th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 930.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Naquin, 744 F.3d at 930-31.
Id. at 931.
Id.
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in both of his feet and sustained a lower abdominal hernia.153
Naquin’s cousin’s husband, also an EBI employee, was killed
when the crane toppled onto the building he was in at the
time.154 Subsequently, Naquin underwent several reparative
surgeries but was unable to return to physical work due to
residual chronic foot pains, difficulty walking, and
depression.155 He then filed a Jones Act claim against EBI in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana.156 After qualifying him for seaman status, the jury
found EBI to be negligent and awarded Naquin $1,000,000 for
past and future physical pain and suffering, $1,000,000 for past
and future mental pain and suffering, and $400,000 for future
lost wages.157 EBI appealed the grant of Jones Act seaman
status to Naquin.158
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit applied the two prong
Chandris test and affirmed Naquin’s seaman status.159 First,
the court found it clear that Naquin “did the ship’s work and
contributed to the function of EBI’s vessels[,]” as a majority of
his time was spent repairing, cleaning, painting, and
maintaining EBI’s thirty vessel fleet.160 Additionally, the
remainder of his tasks aboard the EBI vessels, which included
operating the marine crane and securing the deck for voyages,
were “necessary to the function and operation of any vessel.” 161
The court also found that Naquin’s connection to EBI’s lift-boat
fleet was substantial in both duration and nature.162 It held
that the repair, maintenance, and operation tasks that
occupied seventy percent of Naquin’s time satisfied the
duration requirement, and that the danger involved in working
on docked vessels was sufficient exposure to the sea’s perils to
satisfy the nature requirement of the Chandris test’s second

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
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prong.163
In a strongly written dissent, Circuit Judge Edith Jones
asserted that Naquin was not a Jones Act seaman because he
failed both the duration and nature components of the
Chandris test’s second prong.164 She attacked the majority’s
conclusion that Naquin automatically satisfied the duration
component because seventy percent of his duties were related
to repair and maintenance of EBI’s fleet of lift boats.165 Circuit
Judge Jones reminded her colleagues that the Barrett thirty
percent rule was only a guideline “[a]nd where undisputed
facts reveal that a maritime worker has a clearly inadequate
temporal connection to vessels in navigation, the court may
take the question from the jury[.]”166 She explained that the
thirty percent figure does not apply to land-based employees
like Naquin, who work almost exclusively on vessels that
underwent repairs while moored, jacked-up or docked in the
shipyard canal.167 According to Circuit Judge Jones, applying
the Barrett guideline to employees like Naquin essentially
allows all vessel repairmen to satisfy the duration requirement
despite their protection from maritime dangers.168 Such a rule
would disregard the purpose of the Jones Act, as outlined in
Chandris, to protect a special class of workers who, by the
nature of their employment, are exposed to unique risks.169
Similarly, Circuit Judge Jones criticized the majority for
merely passing over the nature requirement by stating,
without sufficient support, that employees working on docked
vessels are exposed to the sea’s perils and dangers.170 She
distinguished the many cases the majority used to justify its
conclusion by explaining that those cases involved maritime
workers whose exposure to and activity at sea were far more
substantial than Naquin’s.171 Circuit Judge Jones argued that
163. Id. at 933-35 (comparing this case to In re Endeavor Marine, Inc.,
234 F.3d 287 (5th Cir. 2000)).
164. Id. at 941-44.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 942 (citing Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 371 (1995)).
167. Id.
168. Naquin, 744 F.3d at 942.
169. Id. at 942-43.
170. Id. at 944.
171. See id.
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Naquin’s primarily land based duties, performed dockside,
should have prevented his qualification as a Jones Act
seaman.172
VI. Why This Holding Was A Mistake & An Alternative
Approach
The Naquin holding will have a nationwide impact on
Jones Act litigation going forward.
The Fifth Circuit’s
“substantial Jones Act caseload” makes it the leader among the
federal circuits in maritime litigation to which other circuits
look to for guidance with their own maritime caseloads.173
Therefore, the Fifth Circuit’s broadening of Jones Act seaman
status qualification in Naquin will be felt on a substantial
scale. Yet its application of the seaman status test in Naquin
is contrary to the purpose of the Jones Act and has expanded
its inclusion beyond what Congress intended. Despite the
United States Supreme Court’s numerous corrective
restrictions of the Jones Act seaman definition since 1920, the
Fifth Circuit has inexplicably determined that a broad, allinclusive definition is appropriate. It has created an overqualification of eligibility for a remedy intended for a
particular, special class of workers. With its Naquin holding,
the Fifth Circuit has qualified an entirely new class of workers
to the benefits and protections of the Jones Act by making
satisfaction of the Chandris test’s second prong improperly

172. Id.
173. Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347 (1995). See, e.g., Cunningham
v. Interlake S. S. Co., 567 F.3d 758, 761 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Jones v.
Tidewater Marine, L.L.C., 262 F. App’x. 646, 648 (5th Cir. 2008), to explain
that in maintenance and cure actions, where there is no specific statute of
limitations, the equitable defense of latches can serve as a limit on the time
to bring suit); Morehead v. Atkinson-Kiewit, J/V, 97 F.3d 603, 613 (1st Cir.
1996) (following the analytical approach employed by the Fifth Circuit in
determining whether a dual-capacity vessel could be held liable under section
905(b) of LHWCA for breach of its Scindia duties); Kathriner v. UNISEA,
Inc., 975 F.2d 657, 661 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing several Fifth Circuit cases
where court held the structure at issue was not a “vessel in navigation” for
Jones Act purposes); Hurst v. Pilings & Structures, Inc., 896 F.2d 504, 505
(11th Cir. 1990) (citing the pre-Chandris test utilized in the Fifth Circuit
pursuant to its analysis in Guidry v. S. Louisiana Contractors, Inc., 614 F.2d
447, 452 (5th Cir. 1980)).
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easy to achieve.174
First, as Circuit Judge Jones correctly observed in her
dissenting opinion, the Barrett thirty percent guideline applies
to truly sea based maritime workers, whose duties and
responsibilities bring them to sea for at least the minimum
amount of time.175 The Chandris Court did not hold to the
contrary. Despite acknowledging that seamen do not have to
solely work aboard a vessel to qualify as such and that not all
ship repairmen, as a matter of law, lack the requisite
connection, that Court specifically stated, “the Jones Act
remedy may be available to maritime workers who are
employed by a shipyard and who spend a portion of their time
working on shore but spend the rest of their time at sea.”176 By
allowing repairmen like Naquin, whose duties almost entirely
involved docked vessels and other land based work, to satisfy
the duration component of the Chandris test’s second-prong,
the Fifth Circuit has essentially ensured that all repairmen
working on temporarily docked or moored vessels for the
requisite length of time will satisfy that requirement without
ever being at open sea and exposed to the dangers that
concerned Congress a century ago. Its holding does away with a
status based inquiry that the United States Supreme Court
clearly prefers and returns the analysis to the Haverty Court’s
locality of injury test that was unmistakably disapproved and
overruled.177 Qualifying Naquin as a Jones Act seaman
suggests that any employee that works on a vessel for the
thirty percent threshold is a seaman, regardless of whether his
or her work is truly sea based or land based.
The Fifth Circuit’s holding has also liberalized the nature
component of the Chandris test’s second prong. In Chandris,
the Court explicitly stated that the purpose of the substantial
connection requirement is to reserve Jones Act protection for
“sea-based maritime employees whose work regularly exposes
them to the special hazards and disadvantages to which they
174. See Naquin v. Elevating Boats, L.L.C., 744 F.3d 927, 942-43 (5th
Cir. 2014).
175. See id.
176. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 364 (citing Southwest Marine, Inc. v. Gizoni,
502 U.S. 81 (1991)).
177. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
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who go down to sea in ships are subject.”178 It is incorrect to
characterize Naquin’s exposure to maritime dangers while
working on docked vessels as similar to those of maritime
workers who spend extended periods of time at open sea. The
particulars of Naquin’s employment did not expose him to the
same risks of “sudden sicknesses from change of climate,
exposure to perils, and exhausting labour”179 that those sent to
sea for substantial periods of time are exposed. Congress was
not concerned about land based repairmen, like Naquin, who
could call in sick, stay home, and pick up medicine from a local
pharmacy if he had a simple cold. Congress was concerned
about maritime employees who are often at sea and risk the
consequences of injuring themselves or falling sick while
unable to seek appropriate medical attention immediately. The
Fifth Circuit has outright ignored the United States Supreme
Court’s instruction that analysis of the nature component of
the Chandris test’s second prong focus on whether the
employee’s duties take him to sea.180 Its holding has nullified
the characterization of the Jones Act as a special remedy that
is reserved for a class of workers that are inherently exposed to
unique risks.
The consequences of the Fifth Circuit’s Naquin holding are
alarming. It has the potential to increase the instances of
maritime workers walking in and out of Jones Act coverage, a
situation the courts have striven to avoid.181 It will certainly
amplify the number of Jones Act cases filed, as land based
maritime workers, once unquestionably covered exclusively
under the LHWCA, attempt to seize the advantages of the
more generous statute.182 The result will be an enormously
178. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 354 (citing Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328
U.S. 85, 104 (1946)).
179. See Collins supra note 30, at 177.
180. Harbor Tug & Barge Co. v. Papai, 520 U.S. 548, 555 (1997).
181. Jim Brown & Danielle R. Carlson, Naquin v. Elevating Boats: Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals [Over] Simplifies Its “Seaman Status” Analysis?,
LEGGE, FARROW, KIMMITT, MCGRATH, & BROWN, L.L.P., Apr. 2014, at 3,
http://www.leggefarrow.com/assets/docs/news/NewsletterNaquinvElevatingBoats.pdf
182. Id. See also Stuart Crozier, Land Based Workers and Potential
Jones
Act
Status,
STEAMSHIP
MUTUAL,
Oct.
2014,
http://www.steamshipmutual.com/publications/Articles/potentialjonesactstat
us.htm.
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heavy burden on vessel repair companies and other shipyard
operators that now must anticipate Jones Act claims from all
employees that spend thirty percent or more of their time on
the company vessels, regardless of whether those vessels are at
open sea, docked, or secured in the company shipyard.183 The
amount of insurance coverage for Jones Act claims, and
expenses related thereto, required for such companies will
increase substantially.184 With a broadened pool of potentially
injured workers capable of asserting Jones Act claims,
insurance companies will rewrite their policies and increase
the premiums demanded from vessel repair companies and
other shipyard operators.185 Such consequences put maritime
employers at an unfair disadvantage and make their
exploitation by employees desiring an easier path to
substantial recovery more feasible.
Admittedly, a finite list of maritime occupations that
qualify for Jones Act seaman status is not preferable. The
American economy has always been shaped by the then
existing state of technology. It is impossible to predict how
future advancements will affect the maritime industry or what
maritime jobs will exist decades from now. But, with the
Naquin decision, the Jones Act has departed too far from what
Congress intended it to be. At its core, the Jones Act is a
special protection for maritime employees whose occupation
exposes them to special dangers that the average American
worker is not. The Supreme Court respected this intent and
developed an analysis that was meant to distinguish the former
from the latter.186 It also made clear that, when making this
distinction, one should focus on whether the employee’s duties
“take him to sea.”187 Certainly, the ideal seaman status test

183. Harry Morse, In Naquin v. EBI, Fifth Circuit Concludes a Plaintiff
Can be Both a Jones Act Seaman and a Longshoreman, DUNCAN & SEVIN,
L.L.C., March 18, 2014, http://duncansevin.com/in-naquin-v-ebi-fifth-circuitconcludes-a-plaintiff-can-be-both-a-jones-act-seaman-and-a-longshoreman/.
184. Id.
185. Christopher Hannan, Fifth Circuit Expands Coverage of Jones Act,
Rules That Shipyard Employee Injured in Shore-Based Crane Incident is a
Seaman, BAKER, DONELSON, BEARMAN, CALDWELL & BERKOWITZ, P.C. (Mar.
11, 2014),t http://www.bakerdonelson.com/maritime_blog/?entry=474.
186. See generally Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis , 515 U.S. 347 (1995).
187. Harbor Tug & Barge Co. v. Papai, 520 U.S. 548, 555 (1997).
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would respect these fundamental principles and also allow for
future unknowns.
Therefore, the two prong Chandris seaman status test
should endure, as the analysis should remain status based.
This will preserve the congressional intent upon which the
Jones Act was based through the economic changes and
technological advancements in the decades and centuries to
come. But the second prong of that test should be modified,
particularly in relation to the implications of the Barrett thirty
percent threshold.
Instead, a maritime worker whose
employment requires him to spend thirty percent of his time on
a vessel at sea188 is a Jones Act seaman. On the other hand, a
maritime worker whose employment requires him to spend less
than thirty percent of his time on a vessel at sea can only be
deemed a Jones Act seaman if the nature of his employment
exposes him to the perils of the sea in such a way that he falls
within the special class of employees that the Jones Act was
intended to protect. That additional inquiry shall be a mixed
question of law and fact. That is, where there is no reasonable
interpretation to the contrary, a court must determine whether
the particular maritime employee is the class of worker that
Congress intended to protect through the Jones Act. But,
where reasonable persons could differ as to whether the
particular employee falls within that class of worker, when
considering all other relevant factors, it is a question of fact for
the jury.
Thus, satisfaction of the duration component equals
satisfaction of the nature component, because those who
perform at least thirty percent of their duties at sea are
presumptively exposed to the unique dangers that accompany
such employment.
But failing to satisfy the duration
component does not necessarily preclude designation as a
seaman. The burden is then placed on the maritime plaintiff,
who is seeking a special remedy, to show that he is the type of
employee that Congress had in mind when it enacted the Jones
Act. By focusing the analysis on which workers are sent to sea
in the course of their employment, the courts can ensure that
the congressional intent supporting the Jones Act’s enactment,
188. That is, aboard unsecured vessels while at open-water.
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and the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of what
that intent demands, will not be lost, while also allowing for
future advancements in the maritime industry.
VII.

Conclusion

The most recent chapter in the Jones Act’s tortured history
includes a movement away from what was intended by
Congress nearly a century ago. The Fifth Circuit’s holding in
Naquin v. Elevating Boats, L.L.C. has broadened the scope of
maritime employees eligible for the Jones Act’s special
protections in a way that has removed the special nature that
Congress intended to attach to the statute. Upon its next
opportunity, it is imperative that the United States Supreme
Court restore Jones Act seaman status qualification to its
proper reach.
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